

## **GOA: A FRACTURED VERDICT**

### **Introduction**

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The State of Goa has two parliamentary constituencies (PC): Panaji and Mormugao<sup>i</sup> and a total of 40 assembly constituencies (AC); 19 in Panaji PC and 21 in Mormugao PC. In the 2004 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP retained control over the Panaji constituency but lost its Mormugao constituency to the Congress. This fractured verdict was yet another piece of the bigger puzzle that the 14<sup>th</sup> general elections produced. The BJP government in Goa, like its counterpart in Delhi, despite its popular leadership, feel good factor and the general belief that it was capable of delivering good governance, while retaining Panaji PC, failed to convert its popularity into concrete votes in the Mormugao constituency. Although the two PCs voted differently and their respective verdicts will be explained in the course of this article, the BJP's loss of the Mormugao constituency is intriguing for a number of reasons. In the 1999 Lok Sabha elections the BJP had won both the PCs. The result at the time was a remarkable achievement for the BJP, considering that the party had never before won a seat in either of the parliamentary constituencies. Apart from this, the BJP was yet to have tasted control of the State legislature. This changed in 2000, when the BJP withdrew support to Sardinha Government and manipulating the fissures and dissent in the Congress, Manohar Parrikar became the first BJP Chief Minister of the State. In 2002 assembly elections the voters returned a hung assembly but the BJP with the help of regional groups was able to form the government and Manohar Parrikar was re-appointed as Chief Minister<sup>ii</sup>. Apart from the significant gains made by the BJP in State politics, results of the NES 2004 survey carried out in Goa showed that in both the PCs, respondents gave better marks to the BJP as compared to the Congress when it came to issues of governance, leadership and curbing corruption. Thus, given the perceived popularity of the BJP, the loss of the South Goa seat is particularly baffling.

Perhaps the key to the 2004 jigsaw lies in piecing together the historical, social, political factors within which political life in Goa is conducted and by minutely probing into the data generated by the NES 2004. This article will in Part I set out to first provide the reader with a brief background of Goan politics since liberation and highlight some of its broad trends. In part II, the article will then move into an analysis of the NES 2004 survey in order to explain why the two constituencies voted the way they did in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. It is hoped that by using such a trajectory a better understanding of the recent elections would be achieved.

### **Part – I A Brief Political History of Goa**

Goa's Portuguese colonial baggage carries with it contradictions and fractured identities symbolised by the division of the State into Old and New Conquests<sup>iii</sup>, which in the post liberation period gets crystallized into two distinct schools of thought, those who

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advocated Goa's unique identity and those who dismissed it as a gimmick of the vested interests. These two schools led to the emergence of two regional political parties during Goa's first general election in 1963: The Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP) that propagated merger of Goa into Maharashtra while the United Goans Party (UGP) that demanded separate statehood for Goa. The MGP had its base in the New Conquests of North and South Goa. It was identified with Hindu masses, the Bahujan Samaj. The UGP had its base in the Old Conquests of North and South Goa. It was identified with Christians, landlords and later a few upper caste Hindus were encouraged to join it. The identity issue became so contentious that in January 1967 the Government of India held an Opinion Poll to decide the matter. The people rejected merger with Maharashtra and instead voted for a separate identity as a Union Territory.

Goan politics between 1963-1979 is a case of a two party system at its best; the MGP sat in government and the UGP served as a constructive opposition. This period of politics focused on the issues of identity, language, merger, separate statehood, caste and religion. But far from evolving a democratic style of functioning the political institutions fashioned themselves into a colonial style of dictatorial politics. Goa's first Chief Minister and MGP leader Dyanand Bandodkar's, "personalized politics" in 1970, led to the split in the party, the breakaway wing of the MGP, the NAVMGP connived with the UGP to bring the downfall of the Government but Bandodkar managed to turn the tables on the rebels by engineering a split in the UGP itself. The UGP Progressive Group led by Orlando Sequeira, lured by prospect of sharing power and profit, came to the rescue of the government in a vote of confidence (Fernandes 1997:44). This was the first set of defection which set the trend for Goan politics for years to come. Bandodkar's political skill succeeded in crushing the dissent in the party and Government. He virtually turned them into his personal fiefdoms. (Rubinoff 1999:99) Mrs. Shashikala's Kakadkar, who succeeded him in 1973, continued her father's legacy. Her "personality cult" led to the exit of Mr. Pratap Singh Rane from the Cabinet, who later joined the Congress. Mrs. Shashikala's authoritarian politics brought another major crack, one which was irreparable; her Law Minister Shankar Laad in 1979 along with 16 MLA's joined hands with the opposition to defeat the government on a cut motion, which led to the dissolution of the assembly and the curtain was drawn on 16 years of MGP rule. This marked the end of regional party politics and the beginning of national party politics. The two regional the parties had seen the reading on the wall: merge or perish but it was the UGP factions that took the bold step of integrating with the national parties. Dr. Wilfred D'Souza was instrumental in bringing the bulk of UGP A.B. Naik Group into the Congress (S) during the emergency of 1976 and then later into Congress (U) and subsequently Congress (U) was merged into Congress (I). Dr. Wilfred D'Souza was appointed as an adhoc Goa Pradesh Congress Committee President (GPCC). The MGP kept aloof from the national, parties. In 1980 assembly elections the MGP won only seven seats it got 35.39% votes. The Congress strengthened with the entry of many MGP stalwarts in the party won 20 seats and got 41.38% votes (Assembly Elections Ready Reference 1994:34-35) and was installed in Government under the leadership of Pratap Singh Rane. The defeat of the MGP in 1980 marked the emergence of non-communal, issue-oriented politics, where for the first time; the voters exercised their franchise on the basis of government performance (Rubin off 1998:109]

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The leaders who joined the national parties did not leave behind their baggage of personal egos and ambitions. Pratap Singh Rane was the compromise candidate because of the contending claims of Dr. Wilfred D'Souza and Babu Naik - both senior members of the former UGP, for the Chair of the Chief Minister. The Cold War between the two leaders led to a long drawn power struggle between the organisational and the legislative wing of the Congress, which finally forced the High Command to settle the leadership issue by a secret ballot which went in favour of Rane. Dr. Wilfred D'Souza resigned from the Government and the Party and in 1983; he formed his own Party, the Goa Congress. The MGP continued to exist as a rump force (Rubinoff 1998:110). The feeble opposition stabilized the Congress as a dominant and corrupt system.

The attainment of statehood on 30<sup>th</sup> May 1987 opened the Pandora's Box of power and greed. It increased the number of MLA's from 30 to 40 and created new centres of power and ushered a new style of politics. . The period from 1987-99 is aptly described by deSouza (2000) as the period of the politics of pragmatism. As the new State had to generate its own income, it started on a spree of development projects. The expansion of tourism industry and the construction boom generated a market for land. It brought into play powerful interests, represented by the builders, hoteliers, resort owners and the landlords. It brought new rules and regimes, land transactions and new institutions. A new class of leaders entered into the political field that were more interested in self aggrandizement and paid lip service to public interest. This led to the decline of political institutions and introduced defections as new phenomenon in the Goan politics. This politics of *Aya Ram Gaya Ram* put Goan democracy under siege penetrating the entrails of the national as well as regional parties.

The 52<sup>nd</sup> Amendment (1985) was expected to restore the sanctity of the legislature and put the lid on political manipulation but in Goa it could only check retail defections leaving ample room for wholesale defection. Members of the legislature jumped from one party to another and even the Speaker became a part of the game - a collaborator and conspirator. The splintering of parties was aided by the partisan Speakers. So much so the office of the Speaker came under clout, petitions and reviews were filed against the partisan decisions of the Speaker. The partisan Speakers gave judgement in favour of the groups that had defected to their party and penalised those who moved in the opposite direction. Speaker Shaik Hassan Haroon took two and half years to dismiss a case, whereas in a counter case Speaker Thomazinho Cardozo took just forty hours to disqualify (deSouza 2006:390-91). A browse into the report card of Goa's apple cart democracy leaves us with astonishing statistics. In a twelve year period there were 10 changes in the government of which; 7 governments lasted for less than 2 years and one lasted only 2 days (deSouza 1999:2436). The intra party fighting and the clash of high profile leaders left the people so disgusted with their representatives that the 4 month Presidential rule that was introduced in 1999 was hailed as the golden period in State administration. Nevertheless, Congress won the June 1999 State assembly elections and formed the government. The poor finances and organization skills had depleted MGP's strength. The influx of the migrants from different parts of the country eroded its social base. Further its mass base has been mauled by the BJP with whom it aligned in the 1994 assembly elections with the hope of consolidating the "Cohesive Hindu Vote", a strategy

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which failed. The BJP with its soft Hindutva offering managed to poach the MGP vote bank (deSouza 1999:2437).

The politics of instability, the MGP's falling image caused expectations to be raised on the entry of BJP into Goan politics. The new entrant was expected to give a new image to Goan politics: political stability and good governance - the two recipes lacking in the Goan politics. The BJP's image was further enhanced by its performance at the Centre and by the leadership of A.B. Vajpayee. The BJP's popularity was seen in the steady rise of its vote share from 0.47 percent in 1989, to 26.19 percent in 1999 (deSouza 2000:364). In 1999 it wrestled both the parliamentary seats from the Congress when Shripad Naik defeated Ramakant Kalap in Panaji constituency and Ramakant Angle was elected to the Mormugao constituency defeating Joaquim Alemao, a heavy weight of the Congress. The BJP snatched what has been a Congress bastion for two decades<sup>iv</sup>.

The BJP had promised to be a party with a difference but it also succumbed to the trend of what deSouza calls political nomadism (2006). The infighting in the Congress was too tempting to resist. The BJP engineered a split in the Congress when Francisco Sardinha and his factions broke away from the parent party and with the support of the BJP, MGP and NCP was sworn in as the State's fifth government within a period of just 17 months. The BJP had its first kill and was not in a mood to wait. Hardly was Sardinha saddled into power, the politicking begun and within 10 months, his government was toppled and Parrikar became the first Chief Minister of Goa. The BJP critics charged that this action of Parrikar had only exposed his 'holier-than-thou' attitude and had proved his mastery in the art of electoral treachery (Goa Today Nov 2000:3). If friends praised Parrikar government for its stability, its foes felt that BJP virtually usurped power and never really gained it fair and square through elections. In the 10<sup>th</sup> assembly elections Parrikar proved to be a master player; he not only split his alliance partners, UGDP and MGP but merged them into his own fold. Parrikar attacked the Congress on corruption and misrule, but did nothing to cure this malady. His sincerity and integrity came under clout when Anastasio Monseratte was rewarded for joining the BJP with the lucrative Town and Country Planning portfolio. Parrikar further obliged Monseratte by including parts of his Taleigao constituency and Panchayat areas belonging to the Congress Constituencies into Panaji Municipal Corporation, a move that was denounced by the public. Parrikar's good governance also came to be questioned when he issued a legal notice on September 30<sup>th</sup> 2003 for defamation to major daily news papers in Goa to refrain from publishing any further or other defamatory pieces or statements made by the --President of GPCC or by any person. (deSouza 2005) Parrikar's integrity once again came to be questioned when defying the ninety-first amendment (2003), Parrikar poached the Poinguinim AC, Congress MLA Isidore Fernandes in August 2004. Since Mr. Fernandes would be disqualified under the amendment, he resigned from the Congress and re-contested the by-election on a BJP ticket. This Act brought a chain of events and it let loose what deSouza called a Carnival of Greed which ultimately led to the fall of the Parrikar Government.

This brief political travel-logue highlights the broad themes of Goan politics: the transition from regional to national party politics, the Congress consolidation with

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erstwhile MGP and UGP vote bank, which turned South Goa a Congress strong hold, the Congress politics of defection and instability and the emergence of BJP with a clean slate into the Goan politics and its failure to resist the politics of pragmatism of engineering defections and splits. This political mosaic is significant in understanding the enigma of the 2004 parliamentary elections.

## **Part II – Analysis of 2004 verdict in Goa**

Before beginning an analysis of the NES 2004 survey, a demographic check of the NES 2004 sample statistics against the census parameters would be appropriate. The 2001 census indicates that Hindus comprise 65.8 percent of Goa's population, Christians 26.7 percent and Muslims 6.84 percent against this the NES 2004 sample contained 63 percent Hindus, 26 percent Christians and 7 percent Muslims. A recent survey conducted by the Goa Government noted that OBCs together with SCs&STs comprise 33.58 percent of the State's population<sup>v</sup>. In the NES 2004 survey OBCs and SCs&STs makeup 34 percent of the sample. The NES sample comprised 54 percent from Panaji PC and 46 percent from Mormugao PC which almost perfectly matched the population parameters of the two PCs, viz 54.80 and 45.20 percent respectively<sup>vi</sup>. The sample however had a higher representation from the rural areas with 78 percent rural respondents as compared to the 2001 census figure of 50.23 percent rural inhabitants in Goa<sup>vii</sup>. The sample had a slightly higher representation of females than males – 52 percent, compared to the 2001 census figure of 48.99 percent females in the State. Thus, by and large the NES sample served as a fairly good match of the demographic profile of the State.

Considering that unlike big States in India, Goa has only two PCs and in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections the two PCs produced two different results, wherever necessary, the NES 2004 survey data has been sectioned PC-wise in this paper so as to explicate their respective verdicts. Before beginning an analysis of how Goa voted, the following section looks at the electorate's assessment of the Central and State governments, and political parties.

### **I**

In the NES 2004 survey Goan voters were asked, what mattered most when voting in the 2004 elections: was it the work done by the Central Government or was it the work done by the State Government. The results shown in Table 1 reveal that no clear consensus emerges; the responses are rather mixed indicating that the electorate was divided when it came to assigning primary importance either to Central Government works or State Government works. Considering that the responses were mixed, it is useful to take up separately the electorate's assessment of both the Central and the State Government. First, the assessment of the Central Government; when asked to appraise the performance of the NDA Government in the last five-years, as can be noted in Table 2, a majority of the respondents from Panaji PC (57%) gave a positive assessment of the NDA Government. In Mormugao PC, in relatively toned-down numbers compared to Panaji

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PC, a fair number of respondents from the constituency (47%) also had a positive assessment of the NDA.

Having noted the popularity ratings of the NDA Government, the electorate was asked to make a comparison between the Congress and the BJP on a number of parameters which included curbing corruption, governance and leadership. The results noted in Table 3 indicate that the BJP has an edge over the Congress in all the three parameters and this is true across both the constituencies. While the BJP's edge is clear in Panaji the same is relatively narrower in Mormugao.

Having highlighted the electorate's assessment of the Central Government and its appraisal of the Congress and the BJP along certain parameters, we now consider the appraisal of the State Government. Respondents were asked, to indicate if the condition of certain public utilities and services like law and order, condition of roads, medical facilities, employment, etc. had improved, remained the same or deteriorated in the last one and a half years. As can be seen in Tables 4a the BJP-led State Government received good marks in particular for improving the condition of roads and educational facilities. The State Government also received fair marks for improving law and order, and medical facilities. However, Table 4b which does a PC-wise break-up of the responses indicates that most of the appreciation of the BJP came from the Panaji PC. When it comes to employment though, both the PCs were in unison that employment opportunities in the State had either deteriorated or remained the same in spite of having the BJP Government at the helm of affairs. This indictment is a reflection of the grim reality of the employment situation in Goa<sup>viii</sup>.

It can be summarized that Goans when deciding whom to vote for, at first glance, seem to be divided whether to assign greater priority to the work done by the Central or the State Government. But, when studying the electorate's assessment of the Centre and the State Government, separately, there emerges an impression of a relatively positive assessment of the BJP Government both at the Centre and in the State. It must however be qualified that the positive assessment was significantly stronger in the Panaji PC, but in Mormugao PC the assessment of the BJP Government can be termed to have been fair. Further the electorate also seem to have had a relatively better evaluation of the BJP over the Congress party along certain parameters like curbing corruption, leadership and governance. While this certainly translated into victory for the party in the Panaji PC it did not do so in Mormugao PC and this is what makes the 2004 verdict intriguing. The following section will look closely at how people voted in the two PCs and try to explain some of the reasons behind their respective electoral behaviour.

## II

In the run up to the 2004 elections, the INC made an effort to forge an alliance with the NCP and the regional parties: the United Goans Democratic Party (UGDP) and Maharashtra Gomantak Party (MGP), so as to set up a common front against the BJP. Although an alliance with the UGDP and MGP failed to materialise, an INC-NCP alliance<sup>ix</sup> was forged and it was decided that the North Goa seat (Panaji) would be

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contested by the State NCP chief, Dr. Wilfred D'Souza and the South Goa (Mormugao) seat would be contested by the INC candidate Churchill Alemao. The BJP fielded their two sitting MPs: Shripad Naik and Ramakant Angle in Panaji PC and Mormugao PC respectively. In all, seven candidates contested in Panaji and nine candidates contested in Mormugao. The total electorate in the State was 9, 32,439. When the election results were announced, the BJP candidate Shripad Naik retained the North Goa (Panaji PC) seat whereas in South Goa (Mormugao PC) the INC candidate Churchill Alemao, defeated sitting BJP MP, Ramakant Angle. The respective vote shares can be referred to in Table 5. In Panaji, the BJP made a +1.9 gain in its vote share compared to its share in 1999, but the party saw a dramatic plunge of its vote share (-10.2) in Mormugao. Conversely the Congress alliance witnessed a further erosion of its vote share in Panaji while making significant gains in South Goa.

In order to understand how the electorate voted we need to examine the voting pattern of various communities who make up the electoral social bases. Beginning with religious communities; as the census parameters reveal the minorities, especially the Christians comprise a significant portion of Goa's population and therefore appealing to religious communities has always been part of the political calculus. A summary of how the electorate voted in the 2004 elections, as religious blocks, can be referred to in Table 6. While the BJP received a majority of its votes from the Hindu community, the Congress alliance received a good majority of the Christian vote. This trend provides a rough marker of the respective voter base of the two parties. It must be noted however that Hindus comprise the majority in both the PCs, although Christians have a relatively greater strength in South Goa, especially in the Old Conquest ACs. Christians in South Goa therefore play a decisive role in swinging votes and this has been reflected in previous election results where Mormugao PC has almost consistently had a Christian MP and Panaji PC, a Hindu MP.

Having demonstrated the electoral behaviour along religious lines, it is important however to stress that the same represents a rough pattern and is by no means a cardinal rule, otherwise how else would it be possible to explain the Congress-alliance's 55.2 percent vote share in Mormugao? Thus, a nuanced analysis going beyond the Hindu-BJP and Christian-Congress reasoning is required. First, it can be noticed that the Hindu support for the BJP i.e. 65 percent is not as solid as the Christian's 81 percent support for the Congress-alliance. We need to therefore look within the Hindu voters and this brings us to the examination of the second important social base of politics – caste and kinship. The survey reveals that in the election, the SCs&STs together with the OBC voters witnessed a near equal split between the Congress and the BJP in the Mormugao PC while remaining largely pro-BJP in Panaji<sup>x</sup>. The reasons for this split; some newspapers attributed the gains made by the Congress-alliance in Hindu-dominated ACs in Mormugao to the successful campaigning by the Congress MLAs and popular OBCs leaders like Ravi Naik in Ponda and Subhash Shirodkar in Shiroda. But in the 1999 parliamentary elections their popularity and appeal had not translated into gains for the Congress. It is pertinent to note that in the 1999 election, Congress was most disunited and the various factions did not allow it to function as a coercive force. Ravi Naik was in charge of the North Goa election campaign whereas Sardinha was in charge of South

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Goa. There were rumours that the leaders sabotaged the Congress victory, however there was no conclusive evidence to substantiate the same. In the 2004 Parliamentary Elections the Congress unity played decisive role in the Congress victory in South Goa. But to explain the South Goa results just in terms of unity would be too simplistic explanation. Perhaps there were more significant factors which were at play during the 2004 elections and one of these was the personal popularity of Congress contestant Churchill Alemao, often regarded as a 'people's man' whose non-elite background had attracted the appeal of the masses cutting across religious lines<sup>xi</sup>. Churchill Alemao attributed his victory to the Bahujan Samaj whether they were Hindus, Catholics or Muslims. It should be remembered Churchill Alemao as UGDP candidate had defeated a sitting Congress MP, Mr. Eduardo Faleiro in the 1996 Parliamentary elections with a margin of 25294 votes (Lok Sabha Elections Reference Handbook 2004). The survey revealed that another factor which went against the BJP in South Goa was the incumbency factor and the unpopularity of sitting BJP MP Ramakant Angle. While approximately 70 percent of those interviewed in Panaji PC stated that they were satisfied with the work done by MP, Shripad Naik, just 37 percent of the respondents in Mormugao PC were pleased with the work done by MP Ramakant Angle and 54 percent were dissatisfied with his work.

This section has provided insights into how the electorate voted and some of the reasons why they voted the way they did. It has shown that the Congress, as expected, gained the Christian vote but that in South Goa this advantage could not have been the sole determinant of victory. A crucial Hindu vote coming from the SCs&STs and OBC communities when added to the Christian vote share gave the Congress' the winning numbers. The survey given its methodological limitations cannot throw up evidence to support the claim that local Congress party workers played an important role in securing Hindu votes for the Congress victory even though this may have been a crucial factor. What the survey does reveal is that Churchill Alemao enjoyed a fair amount of personal affinity from the masses. The survey findings also clearly demonstrated that in South Goa there existed a popular displeasure with the constituency work carried by BJP MP, Ramakant Angle. These are some of the reasons which worked against the BJP in spite of the party's fair assessment.

Having explained how the two PCs voted and why they voted the way they did by demonstrating religious-community voting patterns, caste and kinship voting patterns, popularity of candidates, etc. it seems a rather straightforward argument when explaining the BJP victory in Panaji. But when we use the same to explain the South Goa verdict, arguing that the above mentioned reasons were reasons-enough for the constituency to stubbornly resist the BJP, that too in spite of the party's fair assessment begs the question: If Mormugao was so stubborn in permitting a BJP victory how then did the BJP win in Mormugao in the 1999 Lok Sabha election? Section III attempts to explain this.

### III

If Christians and SCs&STs and OBCs voted the way they did in South Goa the BJP would not have stood a chance in 1999. While there was no survey conducted during the 1999 elections in Goa, the AC-wise electoral turnout in Table 7 provides an important



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clue. The ACs of Murmugao constituency have been sectioned along the Old Conquest and New Conquest demarcation in order to explicate the following argument. A close look at the voting, shows how the turnout increased in the 2004 elections compared to the 1999 elections particularly in the Christian dominated Old Conquests, some even touching a 60% increase. The low voter turnout in 1999 was a protest against instability, corruption and factionalism in the Congress Party. A Good Governance survey conducted in Goa<sup>xii</sup> in 2001 revealed that 83 percent of the respondents were either unhappy or disgusted with political defections<sup>xiii</sup>. . Apart from this, the role of the Church was quite significant. In every election the Church guides the faithful as how they should exercise their vote. In the election of 1999 the Church gave a call to reject the defectors and to vote honest and educated candidates. Christians caught in a catch 22 situation of having to choose between the Congress- a party of defectors and the BJP - sometimes considered 'communal', many from the minority population both in North and in South Goa did not exercise their franchise in 1999. From the NES sample around 35 percent Christians interviewed stated that they did not vote in 1999. It seems therefore that the BJP victory in 1999 was largely an anti-Congress vote. This argument is plausible considering that apart from 37 percent of the respondents from South Goa who claimed that they did not perceive themselves as traditionally supporting any particular party, most of the remaining considered themselves to be traditional Congress supporters.

The reason for rebound of the minorities in the 2004 elections may also once again lie in the role played by the Catholic Church. While the Church has always exhorted people to exercise their franchise and elect responsible people, this time the Church questioned the BJP's 'India Shinning' promise to 26.24 crores people living below the poverty line and the BJP Government's commitment to social justice. It claimed that the "Feel Good" and India Shinning were an affront to their miserable existence. The Church made frontal attacks on BJP Government in Goa. It charged that projects were hoisted on the citizens through acts and ordinances and government bodies like the Goa State Infrastructure Development Corporations (GSIDC). It lamented that society was governed by corruption, crime and terror and that politics had infiltrated into the age old system of culture and tradition. It called on the voters to make an honest attempt to restore the democratic rights<sup>xiv</sup>. A group called Lok Shakti<sup>xv</sup>, which emerged sometime before the elections, gave a shot in the arm for the Congress alliance as it openly campaigned against what they claimed to be the BJP's corrupt and communal practices. This propaganda strengthened the minorities' resentment against the growing activities of the communal organizations. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad at its meeting at Ramnati Ponda in November 2000 had passed resolutions calling for a ban of cow slaughter and export of beef and condemning what it called the communal terror being perpetuated by the Baptist Church. (Goa Today Nov 2000:11) It also called for renaming of Goa as Konkani Kashi rather than Rome of the Orient. The minorities were also disturbed by what described as an attempt to saffronize education when BJP Government leased 53 government primary school buildings to the organizations owing allegiance to RSS (Goa Today Sept 2001:11)

### Conclusion

The 2004 elections were inconclusive in the sense it gave a fractured verdict, while BJP retained its North Goa seat it was not able to prevent the Congress from reclaiming its South Goa stronghold. The losses and gains have been analysed on various parameters as the magic of Good Governance and India Shining failed to cast spell on the South Goa electorate. The popularity and the win ability of the candidates and the ideology of the party played a decisive role a fact supported by NES 2004. Caste and religious communities supported by their leaders and organisations like the Church had also their stake in this election. All these forces were at work in different measures at different places and made their dent on the outcome of the elections.

Goa being a small place has only two seats in the Lok Sabha, consequently these results had no impact on national politics except that it added to the tally of the respective parties. But in terms of State politics these elections were significant. It boosted the morale of the Congress which had fallen all time low. The recapture of its South Goa stronghold boosted and rejuvenated the Congress. The political change in Delhi and its victory gave confidence to the Congress to get ready for the big fight; the “poaching game”. On January 29<sup>th</sup> 2005, Isidore Fernandes and three other BJP MLAs resigned from the membership of the house, and from the BJP to join the Congress. More resignations took place leading to the down fall of BJP government and the installation of a Congress government led by Pratap Singh Rane on Feb 2nd 2005 (de Souza : 2006) . In May 2007 State will go to the polls it is to be seen whether the Goans will be able to give a clear “mandate” or it will be still another fractured verdict or a hung assembly.

### Tables ---

Table 1: While voting what mattered most to you?

Work done by...	All Goa	Panaji	Mormugao
Central government	31	33	30
State government	32	38	27
Both	15	17	13
Neither	8	7	9
Don't Know	14	5	21
N	388	177	211

Table 2: Opinion about the performance of the NDA government in the last five-years

	All Goa	Panaji	Mormugao
Satisfied	57	68	47
Dissatisfied	27	24	29
Don't Know	16	8	24
N	388	177	211

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Table 3: PC-wise Comparison between the Congress and BJP on the following issues...\*

	Panaji			Mormugao		
	Congress	BJP	N	Congress	BJP	N
Curbing corruption	21	37	101	27	29	109
Good governance	28	48	134	37	38	160
Good leaders	24	48	126	33	38	150

- Percentage of those saying neither or no opinion are not noted in table

Table 4a: People's assessment of the state government (BJP) on important issues (All-Goa)

	Improved	Same as before	Deteriorated	No opinion	N
Law and order	45	29	12	14	388
Condition of roads	75	14	3	8	388
Medical facilities	43	31	12	15	388
Educational facilities	56	24	3	17	388
Employment	26	25	34	15	388
Relations between communities	35	45	7	14	388

Table 4b: People's assessment of the state government (BJP) on important issues (PC-wise)\*

	Improved		Same as before		Deteriorated		No opinion		N	
	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P	M
Law and order	58	34	19	37	16	8	7	21	177	211
Condition of roads	85	67	7	19	6	2	2	12	177	211
Medical facilities	51	36	21	40	20	5	8	19	177	211
Educational facilities	77	38	14	32	3	3	6	27	177	211
Employment	39	15	22	28	32	36	7	21	177	211
Relations between communities	46	25	33	55	13	3	3	8	177	211

\* Note: Except for N all figures are in percentages, P-Panaji and M-Mormugao

Table 5: Goa Lok Sabha Elections 2004

Parliamentary Constituency	BJP		INC-NCP Alliance*	
	2004	Change from 1999	2004	Change from 1999
Panaji	56.8	+1.9	34.8	-3.5
Mormugao	38.3	-10.2	55.2	+8.5
Total	46.8	-4.7	45.8	+3.0

Note: Figures are in percentage points

- INC and NCP 2004 alliance. Comparison is made between Congress alliance vote share in 2004 and INC and NCP vote share in 1999.

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Table 6: Goa voting patterns along religious lines

	Congress alliance	BJP	N
Hindus	29	65	202
Christians	81	10	100
Muslims	43	43	28

Note: Figures are in percentage points

**Table 7: Comparison between 1999 and 2004 Parliamentary Elections Mormugao Parliamentary Constituency (1999 taken as base year = 100)**

Assembly Constituency		Congress alliance		BJP	
Name	Change in voter turnout from 1999 to 2004	Vote share 2004	Change in vote share from 1999 to 2004	Vote share 2004	Change in vote share from 1999 to 2004
South Goa New Conquest (SN)					
Ponda*	+32	49.4	+20.5	45.7	-21.3
Priol	+25	26.0	+8.1	62.0	-12.9
Marcaim	+15	41.3	+21.9	50.4	-24.5
Shiroda	+25	54.4	+21.6	39.9	-21.5
Sanvordem	+24	35.1	+5.6	54.2	-9.1
Sanguem	+13	41.1	+3.6	51.1	-5.7
Curchorem	+28	49.1	+5.7	45.5	-6.3
Quepem	+39	49.5	+4.2	42.4	+3.6
Canacona	+31	49.2	+5.8	44.6	-7.2
Poinguinim	+28	42.5	+6.5	50.7	-7.1
Total	+26	44.0	+10.0	48.4	-11.7
Mormugao	+22	55.9	+16.4	38.3	-17.9
Vasco Da Gama	+26	55.9	+16.7	39.3	-18.3
Cortalim	+55	59.3	+8.5	26.5	-15.4
Loutolim	+52	82.8	+7.7	11.3	-8.4
Benaulim	+47	73.8	-10.3	21.9	+8.9
Fatorda	+53	56.2	+10.1	39.9	-11.8
Margao	+34	42.4	+1.6	54.1	-2.2
Curtorim	+61	80	+1.1	16.6	-2.1
Navelim	+39	72.6	-1.5	23.4	+0.6
Velim	+66	70.8	-6.4	23.2	+4.7
Cuncolim	+61	66.3	+6.7	29.5	-7.1
Total	+45	64.7	+5.7	29.6	-7.6

Notes: All figures in percentage points.

Actually NN but has been included as SN because Ponda falls within the Mormugao constituency for parliamentary elections.

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# INC and NCP 2004 alliance. Comparison is made between Congress alliance vote share in 2004 and INC and NCP vote share in 1999.

Source: Election Commission of India.

### **Foot Notes**

<sup>i</sup> Panaji and Mormugao parliamentary constituencies are also known as North Goa PC and South Goa PC respectively.

<sup>ii</sup> In the May 2002 Assembly elections, the BJP won 17 seats and formed the government with the help of the support of 5 other legislators (2 from the MGP, 2 from the United Goans Democratic Party (UGDP) and 1 independent).

<sup>iii</sup> Old Conquest and New Conquest is a terminology used by the Portuguese to designate those areas of the state that came under their rule before the 17th Century and after the 17th century respectively, i.e., the Portuguese used a method of breaking up the state into regions where the Portuguese rule extended for more than 400 years, these became known as Old Conquest, the regions which came under the Portuguese colonial rule for less than 200 years, became known as New Conquest.

<sup>iv</sup> It should be noted that the Congress lost the seat in the 1996 Lok Sabha election to Churchill Alemao of United Goans Democratic Party (UGDP) although the UGDP had no ideological conflict with the Congress. Churchill contested the seat on the UGDP ticket in protest of the Congress party's failure to accommodate him with a lucrative office.

<sup>v</sup> Goa State Government Survey: OBCs make up 19.5%, STs 12% and SCs 2.08% of the state population. The STs include Kunbis, Velips and Gawdas.

<sup>vi</sup> The population of Ponda taluka has been subtracted from the North District's population and added to the South District's population since Ponda falls in Mormugao PC.

<sup>vii</sup> When conducting the fieldwork it was noticed that respondents were often uncertain whether their settlement is classified as rural/urban and were often at variance with the census classification of the settlement. According to the 2001 Census 49.77% of Goa's population lives in urban settlements.

<sup>viii</sup> As of 2001 there were 103018 job seekers registered in Goa's employment exchanges i.e. 7.67% of Goa's population Goa's: Statistical Handbook of Goa 2001 (pg. 193). There is a growing problem of the educated unemployed in Goa (see pgs. 193-203).

<sup>ix</sup> We have referred to the INC-NCP alliance as the Congress alliance.

<sup>x</sup> Lok Sabha 2004 - SC, ST and OBC voting pattern

	Panaji PC	Mormugao PC
Congress alliance	31 %	46 %
BJP	67 %	50 %
N	42	82

<sup>xi</sup> Mormugao PCs rating of Churchill Alemao

	Percentage
Good	42 %
So-so	25 %
Bad	6 %
Don't Know	27 %
N	211

<sup>xii</sup> The Survey on Good Governance was conducted in 2001 by Forum for Good Governance – New Delhi.

<sup>xiii</sup> The period from 1989 up to 1999 saw only two assembly elections but eleven chief ministers in Goa.

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<sup>xiv</sup> Sub-Committee Diocesan Centre for Social Action issued handbills which were circulated throughout Goa.

<sup>xv</sup> Lok Shakti is a political front comprising of professionals, businessmen and prominent citizens, the conveyor of the Lok Shakti is Datta Naik a prominent Saraswat leader and businessman.

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